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A Passing Glimpse at
Diplomatic Immunity
By WARREN W. KOFFLER*
Editor's Note: In this article, Mr. Koffler outlines the doctrine of
diplomatic immunity for the lawyer unfamilar with this aspect of
international law as it has been applied in the United States. He
urges that the United States should ratify the 1961 Vienna Convention
on Diplomatic Immunity as a step forward in unifying international
practice.
INTRODUCTION
The concept of diplomatic immunity is a well established
doctrine of international law.1 The practice of holding inviolable
the person and property of a foreign diplomat, and certain mem-
bers of his suite and staff, has been the practice of the United
States since the founding of the Republic. 2 However, to whom
and to what extent these immunities apply has never been entirely
determined. While certain principles are well settled,3 others re-
main in flux.4 Frequently, the immediate facts, more than
principle or custom, have seemed to determine the law concerning
a given situation.5 Should the Congress of the United States
ratify the Vienna Conference on Diplomtic Intercourse and
Immunities, 6 many of these problems would be eliminated.
* Member of the District of Columbia and New York Bars; LL.B., New
York University; formerly associated with the Federal Aviation Agency; presently
practicing in Washington, D.C.
I Farnsworth v. Zerbst, 98 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1938); Holbrook v. Hender-
son, 4 Sanford 619 (N.Y. 1851).
2 The Exchange v. McFadden, 3 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
3 Bergman v. De Sieyes, 71 F. Supp. 334 (S.D. N.Y. 1884).
4 Compare Wilson v. Blanco, 4 N.Y. Supp. 714 (1884), with Carbone v.
Carbone, 123 Misc. 656, 206 N.Y. Supp. 40 (Sup. Ct. 1924).
G Carbone v. Carbone, supra note 4. But see, United States v. Rosal, 191 F.
Supp. 663 (S.D. N.Y. 1960).
6 The United Nations Conference on Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities
met at the Neue Hofburg in Vienna from March 2 to April 14, 1961 pursuant to
General Assembly Resolution 1450 (XIV) which stated the Assembly's decision
to convene an international conference of pleni-potentiaries to consider the
(Continued on next page)
KENTucKY LAW JOuIRNAL
THE BASES OF IMMUNITY
The inviolability of a foreign diplomat is founded upon the
law of nations, and not upon the municipal law of any given
state.7 While a sovereign must assent to the grant of such im-
munity, such assent may well be implied." It is not only un-
necessary, but also perhaps inappropriate for municipal law to
declare the conferring of immunity which already exists under
international law and custom.9 Preferably such legislation should
construe and enforce the existent immunity.10 This point would
be most obvious were the Vienna Conference, which codifies cur-
rent practice, ratified by the United States.
DURATION OF IMMUNITY
Clearly the inviolacy of a diplomatic mission continues during
the entire period of continued diplomatic relationships between
the states concerned; however, there is less certainty as to when
such immunity attaches to any given individual. Although it has
been said that an envoy is entitled to unmolested movement
"eundo, morando et redeundo,"'' diplomatic immunity generally
commences the moment an agreement has been secured from the
receiving state.1 2 The mere possession of a diplomatic title13 or
a diplomatic passport14 would not, per se, create immunity,
unless the individual asserting such status also had a note to
the supreme authority of the receiving state from his government
setting forth his nomination for diplomatic duties in the re-
ceiving state.15 The significance of the note is illustrated by a
case in which an alien lacked all outward manifestations of a
(Footnotes continued from preceding page)
question of diplomatic intercourse and immunities. The resolution invited "all
States members of the United Nations, States members of the specialized agencies
and States parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice" to attend the
Conference; eighty-one of them did. The full text of the resolutions of the
conference are reproduced at 55 A.J.I.L. 1062 (1961).
7 Holbrook v. Henderson, 4 Saniord 619 (N.Y. 1851).
8 United States ex rel Casanova v. Fitzpatrick, 214 F. Supp. 425 (S.D. N.Y.
1963).
9 Carrera v. Carrera, 174 F.2d 496 (D. C. Cir. 1949).
10 Haley v. State, 200 Md. 72, 88 A.2d 312 (1952).
11 Scott, Cases in International Law 291 (1922), in Stuart, American Diplo-
matic and Consular Practice 256 n.90 (2d ed. 1952).12 Stuart, op. cit. supra note 11.
13 United States v. Melekh, 190 F. Supp. 67 (S.D. N.Y. 1960).
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
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diplomatic personality,1" but possessed a note from his government
to another, setting forth his diplomatic status. The court held
that such note, pro forma, is conclusive of the individual's right
to diplomatic immunity; 17 the opinion further stated that it is
inappropriate for the receiving state to look into the internal
relationships between such individual and his government.'8
Privileges attached to diplomatic status continue during the
entire period for which such status is recognized by the receiving
state, and for a reasonable period of time thereafter.19 The con-
tention that a diplomat's immunity terminates immediately upon
the cessation of his mission, 20 is contrary to accepted custom and
practice. The general and better view permits the diplomat a
reasonable period of time to depart. This has been construed to
mean that amount of time required by the officer to withdraw
with his mission.
21
Frequent difficulties arise concerning the commencement and
duration of diplomatic status and immunity where the govern-
ment of the sending state has undergone a change in a manner
other than that provided for in the constitution or laws of the
sending state under which recognition was extended by the re-
ceiving state. Since the receiving state frequently moves slowly
in extending recognition to the new government of the sending
state, the diplomatic mission in the receiving state often repre-
sents a government which no longer exists. Nevertheless, so long
as the receiving state continues to recognize the continuing
status quo, the mission remains inviolable.22 This is true although
the new regime orders the current diplomatic agent to return.
The diplomat may refuse to comply with these orders on the
grounds that he does not recognize the sending authority as the
legally constituted government of the state which he represents.
In such case, a receiving state which has not extended recognition
to the new government will not inquire into the internal relation-
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 Famsworth v. Sanford, 115 F.2d 375 (5th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 313
U.S. 586 (1941); D'Azambuja v. Pereira, 1 Miles 366 (Pa. 1830).2 0 Arcaya v. Paez, 145 F. Supp. 454 (S.D. N.Y. 1956), aff'd, 244 F.2d 958
(2d Cir. 1957); Mongillo v. Vogel. 84 F. Supp. 1007 (E.D. Pa. 1949).
21 Farnsworth v. Sanford, 115 F.2d 375 (5th Cir. 1940).
22 United States v. Melekh, 190 F. Supp. 67 (S.D. N.Y. 1960).
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ships between a mission and its government. 23 If the new regime
sends a new diplomatic agent to the receiving state, and such new
envoy is unable to acquire an agreement from the receiving state,
he is not entitled to either diplomatic status or immunity2 4
PERSONS PROTECTED
The immunities enjoyed by the head of a mission extend to
members of his official household. This category clearly includes
the official diplomatic staff, the ministerial staff, and their
families.25 The extent to which such immunity applies to the
domestic suite is far less certain.26 States have gone to extremes
in either granting total immunity to domestics attached to a
mission, or in totally withholding such privilege to persons
occupying that status. It has been suggested that an appropriate
doctrine to adopt in this regard is "ne impediature legatio": that,
if the servant must perform the least official duty, he is entitled
to immunity.2
7
PROPERTY PROTECTED
The inviolability of diplomatic property is a long established
principle of international law and custom. The immunity ex-
tended to the official residence of the head of a foreign mission,
and to the chancery of such embassy or legation, and to the goods
and records and archives therein, is no longer open to serious
question.28 Such immunity, however, clearly does not apply to
property of the diplomatic agent which is unconnected with his
representative capacity.2 9 Thus, while property of an official
nature is clearly immune from either public or private invasion
in the receiving state, unrelated personal property is fully subject
to such invasion. States have substantially differed as to what
constitutes diplomatic property.
28 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Carbone v. Carbone, 128 Misc. 656, 206 N.Y. Supp. 40 (Sup. Ct 1924);
Magdalena Steam Nay. Co. v. Martin, 2 E & E. 94, 121 Eng. Rep. 86 (Q.B.
1859).26Ex parte Cheuk Gar Lira, 285 F. 396 (N.D. Cal. 1922); Herman v. Apetz,
130 Misc. 618, 224 N.Y. Supp. 389 (Sup. Ct. 1927). But see, People v. Roy, 21
Misc. 2d 803, 200 N.Y.S.2d 612 (1959).27 Stuart, op. cit. supra note 11, at 236.
2 8 Frend v. United States, 100 F.2d 691 (D.C. Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 306
U.S. 640 (1938). United States v. Hand, 26 Fed. Cas. 103 (No. 15297) (C.C.D.
Pa. 1810).29 Byrne v. Herran, I Daly 344 (C.P. N.Y. 1863).
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WAIVER
A frequent problem involves the question whether diplomatic
immunity of person or property, once granted, is subject to
waiver. An often made contention is that the immunity granted
to an individual or his property is not in personam, but rather
assent to that rule of practice among nations against the invasion
of another sovereign through the personification of agents dele-
gated by such sovereign.30 This view grants nothing to the diplo-
matic agent but merely utilizes him as a means of awarding a
privilege to his sovereign; the diplomat is merely a legal conduit,
and thus he has nothing to waive. A contrary, and better, view
regards the agent as the representative of the sovereign and grants
the diplomat such immunity as befits his representative status for
its duration.31 Since the diplomatic agent, and not the sovereign,
enjoys the privilege of immunity under this rationale, the agent
may waive such immunity without the consent of his sovereign.
32
The United States, has adopted an intermediate position: while
a diplomat may waive his personal immunity, the head of the
mission must consent, either directly or indirectly, to a violation
of the premises of the mission.33 Without regard to either rationale
above, as a practical matter, the family and domestic suite of a
foreign diplomat are generally permitted to waive their personal
immunity when they desire to do so, without the consent of the
sending state.
NATIONALS SERVING IN THE RECEIVING STATE
Often nationals of a receiving state are employed by a foreign
diplomatic mission located in that state, in either an official or
an unofficial capacity, although historically persons were granted
any diplomatic immunity which attached to their positions re-
gardless of nationality,34 nations no longer agree upon this matter.
Some nations will not receive their own nationals in any diplo-
matic capacity. This rule may present a significant problem to
newly independent nations who often lack a sufficient number of
30 United States v. Benner, 24 Fed. Cas. 1084 (No. 14568) (C.C. E.D. Pa.
1880).
31 Herman v. Apetz, 130 MNisc. 618, 224 N.Y. Supp. 389 (Sup. Ct. 1927).
32 Ibid.
33 See Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 111 (1784).34 Stuart, op. cit. supra note 11, at 236.
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their own nationals to properly staff their foreign missions and
must rely on the citizens of the receiving state. However, since
receiving states which follow this rule generally have no objection
to receiving nationals of a third state in the employ of the sending
state, the problem stated is somewhat overcome. The United
States does not object to the employment of its own nationals as
ministers of a foreign mission. However this country will not
grant such persons the privileges and immunities of diplomatic
status; their names will not be placed on the diplomatic list.35
There-is a seemingly valid rationale for this position: while there
is no objection to a mission employing persons of its own choice
for the performance of required services, it is most inconvenient
for citizens of the receiving state to enjoy immunity from the
official jurisdiction of that state.
INVIOLABILITY OF THE DIPLOMATIC PERSON
It is fundamental to the basic concept of diplomatic repre-
sentation that the person of a diplomatic agent be fully and
completely inviolable.3 6 This immunity applies not only to the
head of the mission but also to his family and to his entire official
household, including their families. This concept or principle of
diplomatic immunity against invasion of the persons of the
diplomatic agent is the source of all the other forms of diplomatic
immunity. If the foreign diplomatic representative is not free
from interference with his person, he cannot fully carry out the
proper functions of his position, and any further immunities
granted would be of small value.
Inviolacy of the diplomatic person is a principle applicable to
creatures both public and private. Thus official staff of a foreign
mission is not in any way subject to the official will of the re-
ceiving state. Moreover, the receiving state has a positive obliga-
tion to take appropriate measures to insure the inviolability of
the persons of the representatives of the sending state from either
public or private37 invasions. Consistent with this principle the
United States has made it a federal criminal offense38 to offer
35 Ibid.
386United States v. Benner, 24 Fed. Cas. 1084 (No. 14568) (C.C.E.D. Pa.
1830).
3
iHaley v. State, 200 Md. 72, 88 A.2d 312 (1952).
3822 U.S.C. § 255 (1948).
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violence to the person of a foreign person of diplomatic status.
In some instances, this law may be applicable even though the
defendant was unaware of the diplomat's status at the time the
offense was committed. 
3
JURISDICTION IMMUNITY
A diplomatic agent's immunity from local jurisdiction is one
of the most important privileges he enjoys. For 250 years, the
existence and scope of this form of immunity have been stated in
statutory form. In 1708, the Diplomatic Privileges Act provided:
(A) 11 writs and processes that shall at any time
hereafter be sued forth or prosecuted whereby
the person of an ambassador or other publick
minister ... may be arrested or imprisoned, or
his or their chattels may be distrained, seized or
attached, shall be deemed and adjudged to be
utterly null and void.
40
This legislation remains in full force and effect in Britain. In
the United States, federal legislation voids any judicial process
providing for the arrest or imprisonment of a public minister.
41
CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
It has been said that there is no recorded history of a criminal
prosecution of a person entitled to diplomatic immunity in a
receiving state without such person's consent. Whether or not this
is a valid statement of diplomatic history, certainly any attempt to
invoke the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state upon
a minister who is accredited to, and has been received by, such
state violates the law of nations. Where a person enjoying diplo-
matic privilege has committed an act which is deemed to be in
violation of the criminal law of the receiving state, the appropriate
action for the receiving is to request the recall of such person.
Should the sending government fail to promptly honor this re-
quest, the receiving state may declare the offending diplomatic
39 United States v. Ortega, 27 Fed. Cas. 859 (No. 15971) (C.C.E.D. Pa.
18&5).
40 Diplomatic Privileges Act, 1708, 7 Anne, c. 12.
4' Rev. Stat. § 4063-64 (1875), 22 U.S.C. § 252-53 (1959).
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officer to be persona non grata, and demand his rapid departure
from the territory of the receiving state. Whether or not the
foreign diplomat will be held to account to his government for
the infraction of the criminal laws of the receiving state is entirely
up to that government. However, there is substantial authority for
the view that an offending diplomat should be held liable for his
acts, because otherwise, the diplomatic community would have
little fear of engaging in sundry violations of the law.
CIVIL JUISDICTION
The freedom of a public minister from civil jurisdiction may
not be absolute. Nations agree that a public minister is immune
from civil process in any matter which directly or indirectly
concerns his official duties. However, countries disagree about
whether or not such immunity carries over to the personal affairs
of such a diplomatic person. While the majority grants total and
complete immunity from all civil jurisdiction of any kind, a
minority has voiced a contrary view. The latter, and perhaps the
better, view would not grant immunity from local civil jurisdiction
in matters totally unrelated to the official duties of the minister,
but concerned entirely with some commercial or professional
venture in which he is engaged. Generally, when a person en-
joying such immunity commences a civil suit against a national of
the receiving state, such national may enter a counterclaim against
the diplomatic agent. However, while the agent has waived his
immunity as to the counterclaim by filing suit against the national,
the minister has not waived his right to be protected from en-
forcement of the civil judgment should the national be successful
in the litigation.42
STATUS OF DIPLOMATS IN TRANSIT
A diplomatic agent passing through a second state, in transit
to or from a receiving state, is not entitled to privileges and
immunities indentical to those enjoyed by public ministers who
have been received by the second state.43 The extent to which
such person will be entitled to normal immunities extended to
diplomatic persons will largely be determined by the facts sur-
4 2 Stuart, op. cit. supra note 11, at 255.
4 3 Carbone v. Carbone, 123 Misc. 656, 206 N.Y. Supp. 40 (Sup. Ct. 1924).
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rounding his presence in the second state. In almost every in-
stance,44 he would be entitled to freedom from criminal jurisdic-
tion in the second state. There is substantially divided opinion
as to whether or not he is entitled to immunity from civil juris-
diction in the second state through which he is passing.
45
CONCLUSION
Like many fields of international law and practice, the rules
and customs which may appropriately be applied to the privileges
and immunities to which diplomatic agents may be entitled are
not fully determined. Frequently, more than one practice, each
fully justified by qualified rationale, may be applied to a given
fact situation. It would seem that uniformity, rather than choice
of rule, would be particularly well suited for the practice of
diplomatic law. In a field which, by its very nature, must include
by reference the municipal law of all of the states on earth, each
with its own diverse background and structure, a single and uni-
form rule of law is obviously essential. The adoption of the
proposed Vienna Conference should bring the principle of a
single universal rule much closer to fruition.
44 Holbrook v. Henderson, 4 Sanford 619 (N.Y. 1851).4 5 Bergman v. De Sieyes, 71 F. Supp. 334 (S.D. N.Y. 1884). But see,
Carbone v. Carbone, 123 Misc. 656, 206 N.Y. Supp. 40 (Sup. Ct. 1924).
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